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A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

of

The *antient System*

of the

EAST-INDIA-COMPANY,

with

A PLAN of REGULATION.

Dalrymple (A.)

LONDON, 1784.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Account, of the Antient Syſtem of the Eaſt India Company, is chiefly written from recollection, or from my former occaſional Publications on India Affairs: I have communicated it to ſome Friends, by whoſe hints I have profited, but I have admitted nothing, which my own recollection did not confirm, or the Records warrant.

Some Apology might be expected for propoſing a Plan for the Government and Regulation of India, but as ſuch Apologies are ſeldom any thing but affectation; I ſhall offer none: If the Publick reap any advantage by adopting my ideas, in whole or in part, all the end I have in view is attained: If they do not, I have no cauſe to reproach myſelf, as the *very wiſh* to be *uſeful* has ſome claim for approbation.

17th May, 1784. *Dalrymple.*

ERRATUM.

Page 28 line 7 *for* the [*Laws*] of *read* [the *Laws* of]

17th *April*, 1784.

Political Knowledge is little more than Hiſtorical Experience.

THE State of Affairs requiring a change in the Syſtem of the Eaſt India Company; a diſpaſſionate conſideration of the Subject, before it is again agitated in Parliament, may have its uſe.

The nature of the Caſe and Conſtitution muſt be well known, before any effectual remedy can be preſcribed: every *eſtabliſhed* conſtitution is preferable to a *new one*; although *that*, eſtabliſhed, may have apparent defects, which are corrected in the *new*; for as it is abſolutely impoſſible to form a perfect Syſtem, there can be no doubt that the wiſdom of collected experience, will ſurpaſs any new Eſtabliſhment whatever, and every attempt to remove *trivial* objections, will give riſe to eſſential defects: a plan for regulating the affairs of the Eaſt India Company, muſt not be entirely a *new Syſtem*, but merely ex-

tend to the correction of abuſes which have ariſen; and adapting the mode of Adminiſtration to the ſituation of affairs as they now ſtand.

In matters of Fact, what was *true* ten years ago, muſt be true ſtill: and therefore I muſt repeat much that has been ſaid, on former occaſions, in taking

A

GENERAL VIEW

of the

EAST-INDIA-COMPANY.

The Eaſt India Company is compoſed of the Proprietors of India Stock, who form the *General Court:* originally, by Charter, every Proprietor of £500 Capital Stock, was qualified to vote, on every queſtion, whenever he became a Proprietor; and no Perſon had more than *one* vote, however large the amount of his Capital Stock might be.

I believe Lord *Clive* was the *Firſt* who introduced the practice of making *Split Votes*; having much at ſtake, and great command

mand of money, with a mind fertile in reſource, by a colluſive transfer of £500 Capital Stock to various Perſons, who had no *actual Intereſt* in the *proſperity* or *ruin* of the Company, He commanded a majority, and thus the *General Court*, inſtead of being an *Aſſembly* of *Individual Proprietors*, became the *Tools* of a *Party*.

This, although an evil, was an evil which in ſome meaſure had an antidote ariſing within itſelf; for when one Party divided their Property to make *nominal Proprietors*, the example was followed by others, and thus the Balance remained in the General Court of Proprietors, of which the numbers only were encreaſed.

The Proprietors were by Charter empowered annually to elect *twenty-four* perſons to be *Directors*, for the management of all the Company's affairs, at home and abroad; ſubject to the controul of The General Court of Proprietors, in which every queſtion was to be determined by *ballot*, if *nine* Proprietors preſent ſo required: By the Charter Four Quarterly General Courts were to be

held *annually*, and a Court might be required, *occaſionally* to be held, by any nine Proprietors: To qualify any Proprietor to be a *Director*, it was requiſite for him to poſſeſs £2000 capital ſtock: and no Perſon could continue a Director for more than *four* ſucceſſive years, when it was neceſſary to remain out of the Direction for *one* year and this was called " being out by rotation."

The Appointment of all Perſons, Civil and Military, in the ſervice of the Company at home and abroad, was veſted in the Court of Directors.

The Servants abroad, in the Civil Line, called " Covenanted Servants," were ſent out when young, generally at about 16 years of age, as *Writers*, who took their Standing, or Rank, on the Liſt of the Year, according to the nomination of The Court of Directors; the whole of the years Liſt to each Preſidency, commencing the time of Writerſhip, from the day the firſt Writer of that year arrived at the Settlement to which he was deſtined: and they roſe by regular gradation

to

to higher Offices; being at their firſt arrival employed in the Secretary's Office in copying the Proceedings of the Governor and Council called " Conſultations" the Correſpondence with the *Subordinate* and *other Settlements* called " *Letters received*" and " *ſent*" and correſpondence with the *Indians*, called " *Country Correſpondence.*" They ſerved *five* years as *Writers* at a Salary of £5 ℔ *an.* then they became *Factors* at £15 ℔ *an.* in which capacity they continued *three* years and became *Junior-Merchants* at £30 ℔ *an.* and at the end of *three* years commenced *Senior-Merchant* at £40 ℔ *an.* in this capacity they continued till they were admitted into *Council*: Antiently the Company kept a Publick Table for all their Servants, but this being abuſed, a ſum was allotted to the *Governor*, who was to pay to every Civil Servant a monthly ſubſiſtence, as *diet money*, and this was the ſame to every degree viz. 8 Pagodas 23 Fanams and 40 Caſh (about £3.10). All the Servants had apartments, to live in, from the Company; who alſo paid Surgeons to attend the Sick, to whom Medicines were adminiſtered at the Company's Expence.

As

As the Servants advanced in years they were removed from writing in the Secretary's Office to the other departments of truſt; and all the Civil Servants of the Company, of whatever degree, under the Governor, except thoſe employed in the Secretary and Accountants Offices, regularly ſorted the Cloth provided for the Company's Inveſtment.

The Court of Directors were not reſtrained, by any poſitive regulation, from appointing men not brought up in the ſervice by a regular gradation; but it was a power ſeldom exerted; and ever conſidered as *unjuſt*, when not ſanctified by *neceſſity* or *public grounds*. When perſons were ſent out as *Factors* from England, they ſerved *five* years in that capacity, inſtead of *three* years as in the uſual courſe.

Thus employed the Servants of the Company acquired inſenſibly, from habit, a general knowledge of the Company's Affairs, and being unſeduced by thoſe Syſtems of Diſſipation which prevailed at home, and ſecure of their promotion by the regulations of the Service,

Service, in which every one roſe to Council by *ſeniority*, buſineſs of every kind was regularly carried on, and as every one had a view to the *higheſt* ſtation, in his turn, every one, who had the ſmalleſt ſpark of ambition, made it his ſtudy to qualify himſelf for that preeminence, which merit alone could entitle him to, after a ſeries of good behaviour in the different branches of the Service, had, at the end of twelve or fifteen years, introduced him into Council. The power, lodged with the Adminiſtration abroad, to ſet aſide from Council any man unfit, by want of ability or general miſbehaviour, ſecured the Service from an inundation of fools in the higher offices; and the power of *appeal* home, prevented, whilſt the Court of Directors remained impartial and independent, an unjuſt determination in the Governor and Council, though I do not know of *one* inſtance where they ever miſuſed their power, by ſetting aſide a man, to whom there was not *very ſufficient* objection. According to the ancient Eſtabliſhment, a fit perſon from the Council was nominated to the Government, without however being appointed in preference

preference to men of ability and good character who ſtood before him on the Liſt.

A Council compoſed entirely of men of Genius, would be much too refined for buſineſs; as one in ten of the Company's ſervants, may be reckoned a man of ſuperior parts, that will be ſufficient for the ſucceſſion to the Government.—Of the other nine, there will always be enough, of ſound underſtanding, to conduct the Company's affairs, if men are ſecured in their rights.

The power formerly veſted, at leaſt by uſage, in the Governor, of allotting their ſeveral ſtations, and appointments, to the Company's ſervants under his Government, was admirably adapted to maintain that ſubordination and dependence, neceſſary to the well-being of the Company's ſervice; at the ſame time that it afforded the Governor an opportunity of encouraging merit: the Court of Directors interfering in theſe nominations is of the moſt injurious conſequence, and muſt be conſidered as one eſſential ſource of diſorder.

It muſt be obvious, from this general *outline* of the Company's ſervice, that the antient mode of providing *Governors* cannot be improved, and that the *education* of the Company's ſervants was admirably adapted to ſupply the higheſt offices with wiſe and able men in due ſucceſſion. This was proved by experience, in a continued ſtruggle through difficulties for almoſt twenty years.

Sometimes, though rarely, the Court of Directors nominated perſons *abroad* into the Civil Service; ſuch perſon was always diſtinguiſhed, on the *Liſt* of *Covenanted Servants*, as "*entertained*," but there was no diſtinction, except in that *title*, his gradation being the ſame as if he had come directly from England with his appointment.

In a few inſtances, the Court of Directors appointed Civil Servants "*fixed*" i. e. never to riſe to a higher ſtation; theſe were generally men ſent out in a particular employment, ſuch as *Aſſay Maſter*, but it was ſometimes when a Perſon, without deſerving to be diſ-

miſſed the Service, was, from incapacity or other cauſes, unworthy to be promoted.

The Company's Adminiſtrations abroad had no Authority to appoint any one a covenanted Servant, but were empowered to grant Commiſſions to Military Officers, who roſe according to Seniority in the ſame manner as if appointed by the Court of Directors, and the Adminiſtration abroad had the power of Military Superceſſion; which was ſometimes partially exerted: They could *diſmiſs* or *ſuſpend* any of the Civil or Military Servants; in caſe of Suſpenſion, they could reſtore the Perſon, unleſs the matter was referred home to the Court of Directors; but they had no power to reſtore a *Civil Servant* when *diſmiſſed*.

The Correſpondence between the Court of Directors and their Adminiſtrations in India was carried on under *eſtabliſhed Heads*, viz.

1. Shipping.
2. Goods from Europe, or from one part of India to another.

3. In-

3. Inveſtment.
4. Country Government[a] and Tranſactions with European Nations in India.
5. Fortifications, Buildings and Revenues.
6. Company's Civil and Military Servants and their Accounts.
7. Accounts.
8. Charter [of Juſtice.]
9. His Majeſty's Ships and Forces.

Supplement, which was by way of P.S. containing occurrences ſince the Letter was drawn up, and

Poſtſcript, which contained the Liſt of *Bills* of *Exchange*.

Letters written under theſe *heads*, were called *General Letters*,[b] by way of diſtinction from Letters on occaſional Subjects.[c]

Before

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[a] At Bombay and Bengal the 4th *head* was "Trade of India, and formerly when Bencoolen was ſubordinate to *Madraſs* the 8th head was *Weſt Coaſt* [of *Sumatra*] the Charter of Juſtice was 9th, and His Majeſty's Forces 10th.

[b] The preſent State of Affairs in India will make it proper to reviſe the *Heads* of *General Letters*, and they will now require to be more in number.

[c] What is ſaid of the Company's Service and Syſtem abroad refers particularly to *Madraſs*, where I was *Deputy Secretary* in 1757. My perſonal Knowledge being confined

Before the *two Companies*, wiſely, *united* in 1702 the Engliſh Eſtabliſhments in the Eaſt Indies had undergone various changes in the mode of Government abroad: I believe the *Old Company* alone had *Forts:* During the period antecedent to their *Union* with the *New Company*, at one time they had a *General* Government at *Bombay*; the *Governor* of Madraſs was *Lieutenant General:* and the *Bengal Factories* were ſubordinate to *Madraſs*, in which ſtate they continued till the War with the *Mogul* when the Engliſh were obliged to depart from *Bengal* in 1688: On the re-eſtabliſhment of the Company's Factories under Job Chanock in 1689 they were made independant of the Government of *Madraſs*.

The First *Fort* of the Engliſh, on the *Coaſt of Choromandel*, perhaps the *Firſt Engliſh Fort* in *India*, was at *Armegon;* but I can find no trace in what year *this Eſtabliſhment* was made: The *Report* of ſuch an Eſtabliſhment

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to that Settlement, I cannot ſpeak with equal preciſion of the others; but *Madraſs* had at *home* the character of being the moſt *regular Eſtabliſhment*, and therefore is the *propereſt example*.

is current amongſt the *Natives* at *Madraſs*, but I find no *record* of it, except in an antient Book of MSS Charts, in my poſſeſſion, ſaid to have been made by M. *Hunter* of *Harwich*, Governor of the Eaſt India Company. In this Collection there is a *Plan* of *Armegon Road*; and alſo a *Plan* of the *Fort*. My Friend Mr. *Orme* has, from his indefatigable reſearches, ſettled, I think, very preciſely, the year in which *Madraſs* was eſtabliſhed, viz. 1640; but no *Records*, of ſo early a period, were exiſting at *Madraſs*, when I arrived there in 1753.

At the union of the two Companies, the affairs in India were put under management of *three independent Preſidencies*, viz. *Fort St. George*, or *Madraſs*, called, by diſtinction from early times, THE FORT; *Fort William* at *Calcutta* in *Bengal* built in 1697;[a] and *Bombay*; under each of which *Preſidencies* were ſeveral *ſubordinates*.

Thomas Pitt, a very able Man, an Anceſtor

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[a] Orme's Hiſt. Vol. 2d. p. 16.

of

of the preſent *Miniſter*, was *Governor* of *Fort St. George* at this time, having arrived there 7th July 1698.

The buſineſs of the Company was tranſacted by the Preſident and Council at each Settlement; I am clearly convinced by the Company's antient Conſtitution, the *Governor's Aſſent* was required to conſtitute *any Act of Government*; and I think this a very proper Authority.

The Governor, or Preſident, ordered the Secretary to ſummon the Members of Council, from time to time when he wanted their attendance or advice; but, by the Company's Standing Orders, a Council was to be held once every week, and Monday was the day on which that Conſultation was uſually held, when the *Book* of *Standing Orders* was minuted to be laid on the Table.

The *Standing Orders* were ſuch *permanent Orders* as had been received from the Court of Directors from time to time, and contained the General Rules and Regulations, by which the conduct of the Adminiſtration was to be guided;

guided, digeſted under the *ſame heads* as the *General Letter*.

The Secretary attended the Council to take Minutes of the Proceedings; ſometimes the Secretary was a Member of the Council, ſometimes not; when the opinions of the Members were taken, The Preſident required that of the youngeſt Member firſt, and matters were determined by the Majority of Votes, the Preſident having a caſting vote, when the numbers were equal: and the Minority were required, by the Standing Orders, to concur in carrying into execution the reſolution of the Majority.

The Secretary drew up the "Conſultation" from his minutes, which were ordered to be read and *ſigned* at the next meeting, and this was always minuted, even when not *ſigned*, but, when the ſubject in queſtion reſted on critical points, the foul Minute Book was uſually ſigned in Conſultation by the Members preſent at the time.

In Conſultation, the Secretary read every *Letter received* and *ſent*, or *Country Correſpondence*,

ſpondence, and made a minute of the Number, which began with the 1ſt letter in each year, and in his fair Minutes left a Blank for the *Deputy Secretary* to make an Abſtract of ſuch letters, the Subſtance of which was thus entered in the body of the Conſultation, and following It, the proceedings of Council thereupon.

Letters *received* from, or *ſent* to, Perſons at the Settlement, were likewiſe read and minuted in Conſultation; and, except Letters merely of official Form, entered after the Conſultation: the Letters of official Form, ſuch as cautioning Commanders againſt fire, and ordering them to prepare for loading their Cargoes, or ſuch like, and Letters not of conſequence ſufficient to be recorded in the common way, were entered by the *Deputy Secretary* in a *Miſcellany Book*, of which there was no copy made.

The Correſpondence with the Indian Powers was by the Standing Orders reſtrained to the Preſident only; the Letters were written by him alone and no others were allowed by

The

The Company to have any intercourſe whatever with the Country Powers.

The Council uſually conſiſted of the Governor as Preſident and ten Members; the Superiour Military Officer on the Eſtabliſhment, which long after I went to India was only a *Major*, was commonly "fixed" 3d: the Governor was Commander in Chief, and Commiſſions to Subaltern Officers were ſigned by Him alone. Sometimes the Military Officer had no ſeat in Council, and ſometimes a ſeat on Military Affairs only and no other; the Perſon next in ſucceſſion to the Governor, uſually was ſtationed at *Fort St. David* and called *Deputy Governor*, but after the loſs of *Fort St. David* the Title of *Deputy Governor* was no longer in uſe.

The Subordinate Settlements where there was a *Fort* and a *Council* were uſually filled by a Member of the *Council* of *Fort St. George*, as *Chief*; but ſometimes the *Chiefs* were not in the *Madraſs Council*, and ſometimes *Members* of *Council* preſided at Subordinates, as *Reſidents*, where there was no *Chief* and *Council*.

The Members of Council filled the various ſuperiour Departments: The Governor was *Caſh-Keeper* and *Mint-Maſter*; uſually this laſt office was executed, in the Governor's name by the *Aſſay-Maſter*; but this was very improper, the Aſſay-Maſter being intended as a Check on the Mint-Maſter: Samples of the money coined were occaſionally taken out, and ſent to England, to be aſſayed, as a check on the Mint-Maſter and Aſſay-Maſter. The Secretary generally, though not always, kept the Caſh Account, but without allowance for that ſervice.

The *Caſh-Cheſt*, of which the Key always remained in poſſeſſion of the Governor, was to contain only a certain Sum; when Money to a greater amount was paid in, it was lodged in the Treaſury under *three keys*; The Governor and the two Senior of His Council, forming The Committee of Treaſury, who had no emolument as ſuch, and under them one of the Company's Junior Servants was *Clerk*.

The other Offices executed by Members of Council at the Preſidency, were

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The Export Warehouſe keeper, who had the particular charge of the Company's inveſtment for Europe.

This office was generally filled by the Senior Member preſent.

The Accountant.

The Deputy, or Sub-Accountant was by the Standing Orders entitled, after ballancing *three* ſets of the General Books, to His choice of any Place, that might fall vacant, either at the Preſidency or Subordinates, not occupied by a Member of Council.

Import Warehouſe keeper, who had charge of the Woollens, Lead and Copper from England.

Storekeeper, had charge of Iron and Cordage as well as of ſmaller Stores.

Military Storekeeper, had charge of Military Stores.

Sea-Cuſtomer, Collected the Duties at the Sea-gate or Cuſtom Houſe; the Duty was 5 ℔ *cent. ad valorem.*

Land Cuſtomer, the inland duties.

Grain-Keeper, had charge of the Rice, a ſtock of which was laid in for the Garriſon

when cheap, and at the end of the year, the Remains ſold, and the amount of Profit and Loſs, entered annually on Conſultation.[a]

Rental-General and Scavenger.

Paymaſter.

Military Paymaſter.

and when the army expences became conſiderable.

Commiſſary to keep the Army Accounts.

At the time I went to India The Company's Goods from Europe were ſold by *Outcry*, or publick Auction, and the Account Sales entered after Conſultation.

The ſeveral offices were not always filled by different perſons, frequently the ſame perſon filled *two* or *more*.

The Preſident and Council were *Juſtices* of *Oyer* and *Terminer* at the *Quarter Seſſions*, and the Secretary uſually was *Clerk* of the *Peace*; the Preſident and Council were alſo *Judges* in the *Court* of *Appeals* on civil ſuits, and the Members

[a] In 1758 a Grain-keeper was appointed; before that time, at leaſt for ſome years, the Charge of the Grain was part of the Duty of the Export Warehouſe keeper.

Members of Council alſo acted by *rotation* as *Choultry Juſtices* to ſuperintend the *Police*, and in turn viſited the Hoſpital weekly to ſee the Sick were properly taken care of, and regular Report made, and entered on Conſultation.

The *Monthly Accounts* in *every department* were laid before the Council, in the beginning of the enſuing month; when the Balance in hand, was reported by the Head of each Department, and theſe Balances regularly minuted in Conſultation: if greater than the Current Demand of the enſuing month the Overplus was paid into Caſh; if the Current Diſburſements were likely to be more than the Sum in hand, an Advance was requeſted.

The Governor's Account of Receipts and Diſburſements, called the *Caſh-Account*, was not only read, monthly, but entered on Conſultation, as was alſo the *Treaſury Account*, the *Mint-Maſter's* Account of *Coinage*, and the *Paymaſter's Monthly Account* of *Extraordinary Diſburſements*.

The Balance in the Caſh-Cheſt was regularly compared with the Account monthly.

Beſides the Book of Conſultations, Letters received, Letters ſent, and Country Correſpondence,

ſpondence, there was another Book kept in the Secretary's office of *Cowls* (or Contracts and Grants) and Commiſſions; and a *Ship-Book*, or Regiſter, of all Veſſels arriving at, or ſailing from, Madraſs.

One copy of each was ſent to The Court of Directors, by the firſt diſpatch in every year: One copy compleat for the year bound up and kept in the Secretary's Office at Madraſs; and a Duplicate Copy ſent, from time to time, in parts to the Court of Directors; and this laſt Copy was called the "broken ſet," as it was tranſmitted in parts by every conveyance that offered directly to England, from time to time. The Index to the Conſultations was regularly kept up, and a Copy annexed to the broken ſet, as well as to both the whole ſets. At the *end* of the year, *Liſts* of *Covenanted Servants*, of *Inhabitants*, and of *Revenues*, were added.

The Books of Accounts from the various departments were alſo ſent home annually to England; but not *broken Sets* of all.

In the beginning of every year, each *Subordinate* wrote, to *Madraſs*, what was called in

an *Annual Letter*, giving a ſuccinct Account of all important Tranſactions, at ſuch Subordinate in the courſe of the preceding year: From *Fort St. David*, *Vizagapatam* and *Fort Marlbro'* at *Bencoolen*,[a] when ſubordinate to *Madraſs*, theſe *annual* letters were arranged under the ſame *heads* as the *General Letters* to and from England.

Although *Fort Marlbro'* was Subordinate to *Madraſs*, the Company's Servants there, Civil and Military, were on a diſtinct Eſtabliſhment, and roſe on that Eſtabliſhment only; and the Servants on the Madraſs Eſtabliſhment, were never employed at Fort Marlbro', except as *Super-Viſors*.

The Letters and Papers from England of each year were paſted into a Book, which is a much ſafer way, than that practiſed at home, of tying them up in bundles, whereby papers are liable to be miſlaid or loſt.

It ſeemed neceſſary, for a perfect intelligence of the Subject, to give thus much of the Company's Original Syſtem, which was preſerved

[a] I am in ſome doubt whether there was an *annual* letter from *Bencoolen*; or only from the *Weſt-Coaſt Committee*.

preſerved till within theſe few years: and having now taken a review of the antient conſtitution of the Company reſpecting their Servants and their own concerns, it is requiſite to ſay ſomething concerning the Government, as it related to the Natives, and this I ſhall do by a quotation from a letter originally publiſhed in 1769.

It is objected that "the Company's Servants leave their Native Country without a "ſingle principle of Legiſlation; and therefore are unfit, not only from their *ſtate in* "*life*, but from *individual* circumſtances, to "be law-givers to the Indians."

'The Company hitherto have never had 'the moſt diſtant view of introducing a code 'of laws, which ſhould regulate the manners 'and minds of the Indians; eſtabliſh a new 'religion amongſt them, and, by deſtroying 'the caſts, attempt a new mode of awakening induſtry, and impreſſing motives of action. The objection would, in that caſe, 'have great weight. But when it is conſidered, that of all the human powers, the '*ability* of forming a code of laws, is *that*

which

'which has ſeldomeſt appeared, and for 'which Solon, Lycurgus, and Mango Capac 'the Peruvian, have the veneration of all 'ages; it would, perhaps be too much to 'expect ſuch a *Legiſlator for India*, from the 'Inns of Court, the nomination of the Court 'of Directors, or even in the delegate of a 'Britiſh parliament.

'The idea of the Company's Government 'does not extend to legiſlation. It takes up 'the Indians where it finds them, under a re-'gular ſyſtem of civilization, ſecured by caſts 'and religious ceremonies, and leaves them 'perfectly free in the exerciſe thereof; not 'aſſuming the power of enacting general 'laws, it can never promulgate the inſtitute of 'deſtruction, by ſubverting the manners and 'cuſtoms of the Indians. And although, 'within the immediate limits of the Com-'pany's ſettlements, in all *criminal* caſes, and 'in conteſts with Europeans, the Indians are 'ſubject to the Engliſh laws; yet in the for-'mer, the jury conſiſts of an eqnal number 'of Indians and Europeans; and in the latter, 'which can only be ſimple caſes of property,

 'diſentangled

'diſentangled from all mazes of law, their 'ceremonies are preſerved in the adminiſtra-'tion of oaths, and in every other matter 'wherein their cuſtoms are concerned. In 'all diſputes amongſt themſelves, they are 'determined by the rules of their own caſts, 'which chiefly decides by arbitration.—The 'Company's government has never occaſion 'to interpoſe, but in flagrant acts of enor-'mity, or in diſorders, where they determine 'by principles of equity and political fitneſs, 'ever preſerving untouched the rights of the 'caſts, which they are naturally attached to, 'having viewed them as an object of ve-'neration from early youth. The office of 'juſtice is executed by the Governor and 'Council, at the quarter ſeſſions, in higher 'matters; and in ſmall miſdemeanours, as '*Choultry-juſtices*, in the execution of which 'office they are directed by precedent and 'general principles of good government. 'This ſketch of the Company's government 'abroad will evince, that it is the fitteſt ima-'ginable for the nature of the people over 'whom they have a juriſdiction; and that it 'cannot be ſo well executed as by men train-

'ed

'ed up from early age with local attach-
'ments and entruſted with judicial authority,
'as a *taſk* annexed to that ſuperior ſtation, to
'which they have attained by a regular pro-
'greſſion of good behaviour for a ſeries of
'many years.—I am far from inſinuating the
'Company's ſervants can do no wrong.—
'They are *men*—but not *worſe* than *other*
'*men*.

'No one in the leaſt acquainted with the
'diſpoſition of the Indians, whoſe manners
'and religion are eſtabliſhed by cuſtoms,
'handed down from time immemorial, a
'ſingle breach in the fundamentals whereof,
'cuts off the individual from the ſociety for
'ever, can entertain a doubt, that the firſt in-
'novation in their cuſtoms, which the ſmall-
'eſt overſight of an act of parliament or code
'of laws may point at, would give the *gene-*
'*ral alarm*, which would ſpread univerſally,
'till we were left the Lords of a deſolated
'waſte, inſtead of continuing ſharers in the
'revenue of Bengal. The only advantages to
'be derived from India, whether in the
'channel of commerce or revenue, muſt en-

'tirely ariſe from the number of induſtrious 'inhabitants; as ſoon as the country is ex-'tirpated of theſe induſtrious ſubjects, there 'is an end to revenue and to commerce.

'Some alledge the inſtance of the Mogul 'government in confirmation of their poſi-'tion, "that India may be governed by the "[*Laws*[a]] of foreign rulers." But in this a 'partial apprehenſion of the ſubject leads to 'a falſe concluſion.

'If the nature of the Mogul government 'be conſidered as relative to the Indians, it 'will be very far from appearing in the ſame 'odious colours that it does, in the conduct 'of the Moguls amongſt themſelves.

'Whatever might be the caſe, in the firſt 'inroads of the barbarous Tartars, the Mo-'guls who conquered India, ever ſince they 'effected that conqueſt, notwithſtanding the 'zeal of Mahometiſm againſt idolatry, giving 'up all idea of making converts to their faith, 'left the natives in the unmoleſted poſſeſſion 'of their religion and manners; thus every

[a] The words between [ ] added to elucidate the Senſe.

officer

'officer having from his infancy, theſe ſenti-
'ments of toleration inſtilled into him, none
'but madmen could ever think of attempting
'innovations, or were guilty of impertinent
'indiſcretions.

'In conſidering the Mogul government
'we muſt diſtinguiſh two periods. When
'the officers in the provinces, were really
'officers of the Mogul, appointed by the
'court, and on all occaſions reſponſible to it.
'And when, by feuds at the capital, civil
'diſcords, and foreign invaſions, the provin-
'cial officers became in *fact* independent,
'though *nominally* dependent on the throne.

'When the authority of the Mogul ex-
'tended to the utmoſt limit of his extenſive
'empire, the juriſdiction of the provinces
'was delegated to officers of different natures
'and denominations; *ſubordinate* to, though
'*independent* of each other; and all immedi-
'ately appointed from the throne.

'In the Carnatick the Nabob of Arcot,
'ſubordinate in a certain degree to the Subah

'of

'of the Decan, had in his province, a *Duan* 'for the collection of the revenue; and 'ſeveral Killedars who were Governors of 'the many forts in this open country. In 'the northern provinces on the Choromandel 'Coaſt, and in the higher parts of the Em- 'pire, where there are few forts [held by the 'Mahometans] the Rajahs ſtood in place of 'the Killedars, to maintain the dependence of 'the Nabobs; theſe Rajahs being very power- 'ful, were always a ſufficient reſtraint to pre- 'vent any precipitate revolt; at the ſame time 'that the Nabob, by ſowing diſſentions a- 'mongſt them, prevented any confederacy that 'might have been formidable to his province.

'It is obvious a government thus diſpoſed, 'ſo long as it maintained a vigour at the ca- 'pital, could not be ſhaken by revolt: But, 'after the Perſian Invaſion had ſhewn the 'weakneſs of the throne, the Subahs of the 'provinces aimed at independence.

'Whilſt the provinces were under ſubjec- 'tion, any attempt upon the Indians would 'have brought down the ſevereſt puniſhment

'on

'on the officer, who dared to weaken or de-
'ſtroy the great pillar of the Mogul's *autho-*
'*rity* in the independence of the Indians,
'and of his *revenue* in their induſtry and
'commerce.

'When a Viceroy aimed at independence,
'with a view to his intereſt, he ſecured the
'Indians from moleſtation, as this was the
'means of enriching the country, and ulti-
'mately himſelf, by the riches flowing into
'the revenue, whereby he was ſecured by
'wealth, from any feeble attempts which
'the throne could have made; and he was
'protected by the affections of the people,
'againſt the machinations of the ambitious in
'the province, who, by violence, might
'have endeavoured to ſupplant him.—Op-
'preſſions were ſcarcely extended farther than
'to a few *rich men*, who are ſeldom in any
'Country the objects of much compaſſionate
'attention, or to thoſe who were ſuſpected
'to be rivals for authority. The Indians re-
'mained at eaſe and unmoleſted, unleſs
'when the Marattas invaded the country;

'then

'then deſolation and deſtruction were ſpread 'every-where.

'The Moguls living ſo very much apart 'from the Indians, ſo far as regards the 'manners of the people, they were in great 'meaſure under their own government; and 'it does not appear any attempt was made 'to introduce a change in their laws, after 'Ekbar informed himſelf of the religion and 'caſts of the Gentoos.

'Laws are only good as they are fit for 'the people who receive them; and the 'knowledge of this fitneſs can only be acquired 'by feeling grievances and inconveniencies '*immediately* as an *individual*, or *indirectly* 'by obſervation of the *effects*, and from con-'verſation of thoſe who do. From this prin-'ciple, an *Engliſhman* is the fitteſt to enact 'laws for *Engliſhmen:* He knows their 'wants, and he feels their grievances. But '*he* is unfit to form laws for the *Indians*. *He* 'can never conceive that *eating a piece of beef* 'can be a ſufficient reaſon for driving a man 'from the ſociety as a monſter of impurity!'[a]

Lord

[a] A ſecond Letter concerning the propoſed Superviſorſhip, 1769, 4to.

Lord Clive in 1765 obtained the *Duannee* of *Bengal* for the Company; this brought their affairs before Parliament, in 1766, when a *Temporary* Agreement was made for two years; that a convenient time might be given, for the Legiſlature, to acquire all the information neceſſary to enable them, on ſo important a concern, to form ſuch reſolutions, as became the Guardians of the Publick Welfare: unfortunately an annual ſum was exacted from The Company, which ſatisfied Miniſters ſo long as They could get *that*; and no competent reſolutions were ever taken; had the *Dividend* to the Proprietors been *reſtrained* on the one hand, and the Government taken *nothing*, but directed the whole of the *Surplus*, after paying the uſual Dividend, to be applied to diſcharge all The Company's Debts, at home and abroad, probably The Company's Affairs would have then been put on a ſtable footing, equally beneficial to Them, and to the Publick.

Lord Clive, and his Friends, made great purchaſes of India Stock, on the proſpect of the *Duannee* raiſing its Price; others, who had not an equal command of money, bought

Stock, on *credit*, for the *expected riſe*: but whether from the *inſatiable deſire* of *more*, or from a difficulty of *ſelling out*, very few of theſe Purchaſes were attended with profit, although the Stock roſe to an enormous price.

In 1769 Lord Clive took the advantage of this riſe, and ſold out £. [a] of his property in India Stock, at a high price: This gave the Credit of the Stock a blow; which he followed, by circulating a report that "our army was going to Delhy." The fall of the Stock threatened ruin to thoſe who had entered into the unequal conteſt with his Lordſhip, and drove them to deſperation.

To ſilence all inſinuations which might keep down the Stock, the General Court were *unanimous* in opinion "that the Com-"pany's Affairs were in a flouriſhing Situa-"tion."[b] However this declaration not having

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[a] The Amount cannot be aſcertained as the Stock did not ſtand in his own name.

[b] Reſolution of General Court on 1ſt June, 1769.

having its expected effect in raiſing the Stock, a *Job* was thought of, and a *kind* of *Coalition* made between the contending Parties; when Mr. *Van Sittart* and Mr. *Scrafton*, joined to Col. *Forde*, were appointed *Super Viſors* to India, with a plenitude of power: new lights having diſcovered, without any advices from abroad, the *ſituation* of *affairs* to be *deſperate* inſtead of *flouriſhing*: Whether this Commiſſion would have produced any good effect? is a Problem which can never be ſolved; as the Aurora, the ſhip on which the Commiſſioners embarked, was never heard of, after leaving the Cape Good-Hope. But it is obvious, if the Commiſſion had been at all neceſſary, it ought to have been renewed in ſome other Perſons, as ſoon as the loſs of the former was paſt doubt, for the iſſuing ſuch a Commiſſion weakened the hand of the ordinary Governments abroad, and deprived them, in ſome degree, of the confidence of the Natives: which was compleatly overthrown by another *Job*, Sir John Lindſay being ſent out to India, the ſame year, as the *King's Plenipotentiary*: It is not the point in queſtion whether the Politicks of India, ſhould be directed by the Crown or the

Company; but that there ſhould be a *Unity* of *Politicks*, is ſelf-evident: a *Unity* of Politicks, however, between jarring Powers, ſeparate in Intereſt and Object, could not have been expected by any but *Gothamites*.

In the end of the year 1768, I was ſatisfied, from a conſideration of the Company's Receits and Diſburſements in England, that they were acting an unprovident part, which muſt bring them to diſtreſs; and wrote my Sentiments on that ſubject, in a *General View* of the *Eaſt India Company*, which I intended to have publiſhed; but the Bargain precipitately concluded, between the Government and the Company, before I had finiſhed this *View*, made me think it then uſeleſs, though I afterwards publiſhed *It* in 1772.

I will not preſume to ſay whether Deſign, or Ignorance of the groſſeſt kind, inſtigated the Miniſters to conclude this Bargain; which, by the accounts then before Parliament, it was obviouſly impoſſible for the Company to fulfil.

In 1771 Mr. Manſhip expreſſed doubts of the Company's abilities to go on, without reducing

ducing the Dividend; however a General Court thanked the Court of Directors, for continuing the Dividend at 12½ *per Cent.* but the very next year the Bubble burſt! The Directors were aſtoniſhed to find in July 1772, that the Company would ſoon be unable to anſwer the calls upon them for payments of caſh; and they aſcribed this, to the *Bills* drawn *from India* and the Indemnity on Tea: That the Bills drawn from India, by becoming due, *occaſioned* the deficiency of caſh, might be *true;* but theſe Bills could not be the *cauſe* of the Company's Diſtreſs, for the Directors acknowledged, they had notice that ſuch Bills would be drawn, 15 months before the Bills were preſented for acceptance; and, after acceptance, they became payable at the end of *one*, *two* and *three* years. Had the Dividend been reduced to 6 ℔ *Cent.* the Company would have ſaved in one year by

Reduction of Dividend	-	£ 200,000
Quota to Publick in conſequence of High Dividend	}	400,000
		£ 600,000

The Deficiency of Caſh never amounted to ſo large a Sum as *two years Savings*, ſo that the

the Company's Diſtreſs was owing, entirely, to *want* of *foreſight* in the Court of Directors; admitting that their Proceedings had no *ſiniſter motives*, and were free from *any influence* of Miniſters.

The diſtreſſed State of the Company's Affairs again brought them into Parliament, and gave riſe to new arrangements, or, more properly ſpeaking, derangements; I at firſt thought Lord North, who was then *Miniſter*, merited great praiſe for his moderation and wiſdom, in inveſtigating the State of the Company's Affairs; but a very little time convinced me this Praiſe was totally unmerited, and that he rather deſerved execration, for the total change he made in the Eaſt India Company, by what he improperly called a *Regulating Bill*, but which may be juſtly ſtiled an *Anarchy Bill*, as it threw all things into confuſion.

The Company's Diſtreſs was at that time only a temporary want of Caſh; ariſing from an improvident expenditure, a very great part of which was paid to the Publick, as *huſh-money*

money to ſecure the Proprietors in receit of a Dividend, which the State of their finances did not warrant.

The *Anarchy Bill* was the Offspring of *Folly* and *Injuſtice:* During a Whig Adminiſtration, the Eaſt India Company was left to adminiſter Its own Affairs; and flouriſhed to the aſtoniſhment of the World! a Miniſter never interfered, but to protect or aſſiſt Them:[a] and, with pleaſure, ſaw a ſource of employment

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[a] To prove that there is no *declamation* in this, I ſhall quote ſome authentick Documents from a Pamphlet printed in 1769.

'As his late Majeſty, in whom, throughout his long and 'glorious reign, the Company had a conſtant friend, ſent 'to India, in 1754, a ſquadron of *four ſhips* of the *line*, beſides 'a twenty gun ſhip and ſloop, for the Company's aſſiſtance, 'without a requiſition of *extraordinary powers*, it is certainly 'a natural queſtion "Where is the *neceſſity* for *ſuch powers* 'in 1769?"

'Have the Servants of the Crown *now* leſs attention to the 'rights and *priviledges* of the Company? or a greater deſire 'to acquire *new* powers themſelves? or is India *leſs* important 'to the Nation than it was then?

'I confeſs the different ſtile of the papers now before the 'Proprietors, and of thoſe which related to Admiral Watſon's

employment for the younger ſons of the middle ranks of the Community, uninfluenced

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ſon's ſquadron is to me, very alarming. Thoſe to Admiral Watſon are expreſſed with the utmoſt attention to the *rights* and *intereſts* of the Company.—I ſhall give a few examples.—In the King's Inſtructions to Admiral Watſon, 2d March 1754. it is ſaid, "The Company having, agreeable to Royal Charter, entered into *compacts* with ſome of the *Indian* Princes, *for giving them aid and aſſiſtance againſt* their *Enemies*, but finding the burthen too heavy, the King willing and deſirous to *maintain* the Company in *all* their *juſt rights* and *priviledges*, ſent a ſquadron to perform ſuch ſervices as may be *moſt conducive* to the intereſt of the ſaid *Company*, and of ſuch *Indian Princes with whom they have*, or *may* contract engagements."

Here, with *parental* attention, his late Majeſty ſends *his* forces as auxiliaries to the Company——here are no *prerogative doubts* or *claims*, but the Admiral is directed

"With his beſt *advice* to aſſiſt the General Council; which the Company have directed a certain number of perſons employed in their ſervice, to form themſelves into, in order to conſider of, and reſolve upon, a proper plan of operation; and when the plan is agreed upon, to make uſe of the force under his command, in order to put the ſame in execution in the beſt manner poſſible."

Here is no requiſition to inveſt any part of the Company's *powers* in the commanding officer, it is only ſaid, "that he ſhall aſſiſt, and be a *Member* of all *councils* of *war*, wherein any ſervice, in which the naval force is to co-

operate,

enced by the Crown: and consequently saw a rising Column of Independence in the Kingdom, essentially necessary to preserve Publick Liberty, by limiting to just bounds the influence of the Crown, and tending to secure the independence of Parliament.

By the *Anarchy Bill* the qualification, to entitle a Proprietor of India Stock to the *right* of *voting*, was the possession of £1000 India Capital Stock for twelve months antecedent:

" operate, shall be taken into consideration." Nay, these ' instructions even go further, for they declare it the " Royal " Will and pleasure, that the Admiral should cautiously " avoid whatever may be construed an act of hostility against " the Subjects, &c. of any European Potentate, *unless the* " *General Council, nominated by the India Company* as *abovemen-* " *tioned*, should *think it absolutely necessary for him to make re-* " *prisals.*" Thus making the Company Judges even in ' European Treaties.

' And after the Declaration of War the Secretary of ' State, under date 11th January 1757, writes the Admiral,

" *The Company, it is hoped, having a perfect knowledge* of *their* " *own affairs, may form such Plans of operations* as *may best* " *secure their possessions*, or *annoy the Enemy*; and *it is therefore* " *His Majesty's pleasure that the commanders of His ships shall* " *concur, and assist in the execution thereof.*"

cedent:[a] thereby depriving the Proprietors of £ 500 Stock of their Franchiſe: The Proprietors poſſeſſed of £ 3000 Capital-Stock were entitled to give *two votes*, of £ 6000 *three* votes, and of £ 10,000 *four* votes: and the Directors, inſtead of being elected *annually*, were choſen for *four* years.

By aboliſhing the £ 500 Voters, in the Court of India Proprietors, and encreaſing the number of Votes to the *wealthy* Proprietors, a great ſhare of Patronage was taken from the maſs of the People, and thrown into fewer hands: and, to ſecure the deſtructive influence of Miniſters, Placemen were required to hold qualifications of India Stock; and called down, by Miniſterial agents, to give Votes on queſtions involving every abſurdity and contradiction: afterwards the proceedings of General Courts, thus garbled by blundering Miniſters, are to be urged as Grounds of objection to the Company.

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[a] By an Act of Parliament 1766, It was required that the Proprietors of every Publick Company ſhould hold Stock ſix months before they were entitled to vote.

The

The Patronage, of the Proprietors at large, was alſo leſſened, by the duration of term for which the Directors were choſen; when the election of a Director was annual, he had an intereſt in courting the good will of the Proprietor, whoſe ſupport was neceſſary to his re-election as Director; and the more generally diffuſed the Patronage is, the more publickly beneficial and leſs dangerous does it become.

The Conſtitution of this Country is, unqueſtionably, in imminent danger if the Patronage of India is added to *The Crown:* The good ſenſe of the Nation, it is preſumed, will never again allow, even of the propoſition, to veſt the Patronage, in either of the other Branches of the Legiſlature, or in a fourth Eſtate. Unleſs the abuſe of Patronage can be prevented, every Lover of his Country muſt execrate India, and all that belongs to It, for open India to a Miniſter, and his Powers of Corruption are unbounded.

I think the ſubject of patronage cannot be ſtated more ſtrongly than in Mr. Pitt's Speech

on *his* India Bill, in anſwer to Mr. Fox. (Morning Chronicle 29th January 1784.)

'Now, Sir, with regard to the firſt of 'theſe objections, that it is a plan of patro-'nage, and not a plan of vigour, effect, and 'of power; that it gives to the Crown a new 'and enormous extent of influence, while it 'furniſhes no new means of controul; to 'this I muſt reply.—Is it poſſible that gentle-'men who argue thus can have read the Bill? 'Sir, I defy any man to contradict me when 'I ſay, that while there is every poſſible 'guard againſt patronage, the Crown's vigo-'rous, effectual, and authoritative command 'over the politicks of Indoſtan, is clearly the 'main object of every line of the Bill. It 'was the acknowledged fault of the Regu-'lating Act of 1773, that it left only a dor-'mant power among his Majeſty's Miniſters 'to negative and regulate political orders ſent 'out to India.[a] This power, I allow, was 'not uſefully, nay not at all exerciſed; re-'ſponſibility lay not then with the Crown; 'but, Sir, does it follow that when an ex-the

[a] There is here an *inaccuracy*, there is ſuch a Power in the Act of 1781, but none in that of 1773.

'preſs Board is appointed, and devoted to
'the object of Eaſt India politicks, charged
'with the whole reſponſibility, furniſhed
'with every means of information, as well
'as every power that can poſſibly be neceſ-
'ſary to the dominion of the Eaſt; does it
'follow, I ſay Sir, that by means of ſuch a
'Board, there will be no active, no efficient
'controul? How does the Right Honourable
'Gentleman torture the imagination, and
'ſtrive to miſlead the common ſenſe of the
'Houſe, in order to perſuade them into this
'abſurdity! He introduces a moſt curious di-
'alogue between the Government Board, and
'the Directors; the Directors appoint a ſer-
'vant, whom (according to his train of ar-
'gument) the Board object to, and ſay, "No,
"you ſhall not appoint this man your ſer-
"vant, for if you do, we will puniſh you,
"by inſiſting on ſuch and ſuch a meaſure."—
"Whom ſhall we appoint then?" ſay the
'Directors.—"Why we chooſe you ſhould
"appoint ſuch a one (ſays the Board) and
"then you ſhall order what political meaſures
"you pleaſe." The Right Honourable Gen-
'tleman, therefore, in order to prove that

'the

'the New Board will have the patronage, 'while the Directors will keep the controul, 'argues exactly thus:—The Board, he ſays, 'will barter their controul for patronage; '*ergo*, the Board will have all the patronage, 'and none of the controul. But, Sir, will 'the Directors agree to ſuch a bargain? Will 'they give up all their right of naming their 'own ſervants, for the pleaſure of dictating 'political meaſures? Is it poſſible to conceive 'ſuch a perverſion of common ſenſe? I ſay, 'therefore, away with ſuch arguments as 'theſe. If any Honourable Gentleman can 'fairly deviſe the means whereby the patro-'nage of the Crown can be ſtill further re-'ſtrained, and its authority in India at the 'ſame time ſupported, I am not only willing, 'but Sir, I am extremely eager, to liſten to 'any ſuch propoſitions, but the Committee, 'I conceive, will be the place for obſervations 'of this ſort. What I contend, and inſiſt at 'preſent, is only this, that to give the Crown 'the means of guiding the politicks of India 'with as little means of corrupt influence as 'poſſible, is the true plan for India, and is 'the true ſpirit of this Bill.

'It

'It has been repeatedly ſaid, that a great 'deal of patronage has been all along de- 'rived to government from the Company: 'what is the caſe by this Bill? In the firſt 'place all influence in England is left to the 'Company; an influence infinitely more 'dangerous to this conſtitution, and more 'liable to abuſe than that which is exerciſed 'abroad. The nomination of all the num- 'berleſs clerks, labourers, and ſervants here, 'is left entirely to the Company: all con- 'tracts (than which nothing can be more 'adapted to the purpoſes of corruption) are 'left to the Company; the preference of 'what ſhips, captains, ſhopkeepers, buyers 'and ſellers they pleaſe, is in my opinion, 'moſt properly left to the option of the Com- 'pany: the nomination of all writers remains 'alſo to the Company, as well as the nomi- 'nation of the far greater part of the ſervants 'abroad. The Crown, in ſhort, appoints 'none but the ſupreme ſervants abroad, 'whoſe authority muſt be tranſcendent, and 'who muſt, for the ſake of unity, be cordial 'with government. Theſe ſuperior ſervants, 'it is true, have a great command of influ-

'ence

'ence in India; that influence, however, is 'materially broken, by being exerciſed only 'through their inſtrumentality: and it muſt 'be farther remembered, that theſe very ſer-'vants will have been named in the firſt in-'ſtance by the Company, and are choſen to 'theſe high offices only after a regular and 'neceſſary gradation. If leſs influence than 'this will ſuffice, let it be ſtill further re-'duced in the Committee; I hope however, 'it is indiſputably clear, that influence is not 'the object of this Bill. I avow, indeed, 'that whatever is given ſhould, in my opi-'nion, go fairly to the Crown, and not be 'delegated to any ſet of men who may per-'vert it to their own purpoſes.

'One word more, Sir, with reſpect to the 'Bill of the Right Honourable Gentleman 'over the way; he affects to tell you with all 'the ſimplicity in the world, that his Bill cre-'ated no new power, gave no new influence, 'erected no new eſtate in the Conſtitution of 'this Country, for that it was a mere transfer 'of power, from one body of men to another. 'Sir, I have already proved it was not a mere 'transfer of power, for the former Directors 'were, in ſome degree at leaſt connected, and

'in

‘ in ſome meaſure co-operated with Govern-
‘ ment; the new Commiſſioners were not to
‘ be connected, were not to co-operate with
‘ Government. But, Sir, this is not all.
‘ It was a transfer of power from a body of
‘ men, unconnected with each other, nume-
‘ rous and fluctuating, by whom the bound-
‘ leſs patronage of India was divided into a
‘ thouſand little wandering ſtreams, it was
‘ a transfer from that large unconnected body
‘ into the hands of a ſmall junto, politically
‘ connected, eſtabliſhed in a manner inde-
‘ pendent of the Crown, by whom India was
‘ to be converted into one vaſt political Engine,
‘ an engine that might be brought to bear
‘ againſt the independence of this Houſe. Is
‘ the Right Honourable Gentleman ſo dim-
‘ ſighted, ſo unſuſpecting on a ſubject, thus
‘ deeply affecting the freedom of Parliament.
‘ and this whole Conſtitution, as not to per-
‘ ceive the political bearing, which muſt be
‘ given to this vaſt machine? Let the cha-
‘ racters of his ſeven Commiſſioners be what
‘ they may, even in that view, I ſay they are
‘ one political band: the collected patronage
‘ of all India, at home and abroad, was to be

'knit together in their hands, to be levelled 'as the party choſe, either againſt the pre-'rogatives of the Crown, or againſt the in-'dependence of Parliament. Compared to 'theſe things, the very loſs of India, Sir, nay, 'the loſs of every dependency of this Country 'were light and trifling; the loſs of India 'were a ſacrifice eaſy to be borne; but the 'loſs of liberty to this Country, the ſacrifice 'of the independence of Parliament, and the 'ruin of this Conſtitution! This is a cala-'mity, this is a kind of ruin, to which I will 'never yield without a ſtruggle."

To form a proper judgement of Lord North's *Anarchy Bill*, a ſuccint view of the conduct of the Proprietors of India Stock, in electing Directors, and in the various motions made, and Reſolutions paſſed in General Courts, before and ſince *that Bill*, would be deſireable; as well as a General Retroſpect of the Conduct of the Company's Adminiſtrations abroad, *before* the *New Syſtem* was eſtabliſhed, compared with what has happened *ſince*; this would take more time than the preſent occaſion will admit: but I am induced to

to give a quotation from a paper printed before that *Bill* paſſed into a law.

'The very extenſive *Political* Connexions 'of the Company in India, point out the 'neceſſity of a *Governor General*; as it is 'abſurd, in the higheſt meaſure to let *three* 'independent *Governments* have the direction 'of the Military Force, and the conduct of 'Political Negociations and Alliances in India, on the very precarious ſuppoſition that 'theſe three independent Governments will 'purſue the *ſame objects* and by the *ſame means*: 'In caſe of a war with France it would not 'only be *natural for*, but the *particular duty* 'of, each Preſidency to provide for their own 'ſecurity in the firſt inſtance, although this 'caution may be the ruin of the whole: I 'here ſuppoſe them all to act merely on the 'defenſive; but a war merely defenſive will 'ever be ruinous in the event; the moment 'of advantage muſt be ſeized and purſued. '—Pondicherry would not have been re-'duced to *Ruins*, if the Engliſh had thought 'a *gallant defence of Madraſs* was all their 'duty required: Moderation however is ne-

'ceſſary in Victory, deſperate meaſures are 'proper only in caſes that are deſperate.

'The objections which have been made to 'a Governor-General are, that, it is inveſt-'ing *too much* power in *one man*; and it is 'alledged to be unneceſſary, as in the laſt 'war the different Settlements made the '*greateſt exertions* for the common welfare.

'The conduct of the Company's Set-'tlements laſt war, and the very critical 'ſituation of affairs then, are with me al-'moſt concluſive reaſons in favour of a 'Governor-General.

'When Calcutta was taken by Surajah 'Dowla, advices were hourly expected of 'the declaration of war with France, and it 'was well known in India that the French 'were ſending out a formidable armament: 'However the Governor and Council of Fort 'St. George, thinking the Company would 'be *undone* if their Eſtabliſhments in Ben-'gal were not recovered, determined *to riſk* '*every thing* in the attempt; Fortune fa-

'voured

'voured their Endeavours, and to this mag-
'nanimous Reſolution the Company owe
'*their Exiſtence.*

'When the affairs of Bengal were ſettled,
'by the reduction of Chandernagor and the
'Battle of Plaſſey, an Expedition was made
'from Bengal under Col. Forde into the
'Northern Provinces on the Coaſt of Cho-
'romandel. Whilſt Forde was on this ſer-
'vice, the French laid ſiege to Madraſs;
'the Fate of the Company again depended
'on a ſingle event; every thing was at ſtake,
'but Col. Forde was not at liberty to come
'to the aſſiſtance of Madraſs; his orders
'from Bengal were poſitive, not to go to the
'ſouthward, nor to put himſelf under the
'orders of the Governor and Council of Fort
'St. George, though He was then within
'the limits of their Juriſdiction.—Colonel
'Clive, then governor of Bengal, wrote to
'Mr. Pigot, in excuſe for this extraordinary
'behaviour, that the Council of Bengal
'would not conſent to Forde's Expedition on
'any other terms.

'That

'That Madraſs and Bengal *in general* acted 'on one ſyſtem during the laſt war, is very 'true; but Mr. Pigot was Governor of Ma- 'draſs during the whole of that period; and 'the Governors of Bengal, Col. Clive and 'Mr. Vanſittart, were Madraſs Men, who 'carried with them into Bengal all the par- 'tialities and attachments natural towards 'the Settlement where they had been bred 'up, and to their Friends whom they had 'left behind; ſo that the Bengal Govern- 'ment was virtually though not immediately 'ſubordinate to Madraſs.

'Every body would laugh at the abſurdity 'of ſending *three* Generals with *ſeperate* '*Commands* to execute *one Service*; but if 'the *three* Generals acted with *wiſdom* and '*publick Spirit*, They *might* be ſucceſsful, 'notwithſtanding the glaring folly of the 'ſyſtem.

'However, although a Governor-General 'appears to me, at leaſt a *very expedient*, if 'not a neceſſary, meaſure; yet the objec- 'tions to a Governor-General fixed to *one* 'ſpot,

'ſpot, and veſted with the *whole* power,
'would be liable to very great, if not inſur-
'mountable, objections.

'The plan propoſed by Lord Pigot appears
'to be the moſt effectual meaſure for cor-
'recting abuſes, and reſtoring every thing to
'order, viz. "A Governor-General, to be
"aſſiſted by the Governor of the Settlement
"where he may be, and ſuch Members of
"the Council as he may think proper to
"ſummon; the number being at no time leſs
"than five; the Governor of the Settlement
"to be always one thereof, and the Gover-
"nor-General to have a Negative."

'Altho' this plan mentions a Council of
'*not leſs than five*, I know it is, and always
'was, Lord Pigot's opinion, that the pro-
'pereſt mode of tranſacting the buſineſs of
'the Company, is by *the Council at large*;
'his ſentiments are that the whole Council
'ought to be ſummoned; unleſs it ſhould
'be found any particular members were led,
'by *private views*, to oppoſe the neceſſary
'reformation or meaſures of Government;

'which

'which he does not apprehend would be the 'caſe, as he thinks a Governor, who is de- 'termined *to do what is right*, could not have 'a *conſtant majority* in Council againſt him.*

'The plan of a Governor-General *fixed in* 'Bengal is highly abſurd; the internal de- 'tail of the Bengal Government is amply 'ſufficient to employ the whole attention of 'the Governor and Council there, and there- 'fore They of all others the moſt unfit to 'have the charge of all India: The Dutch 'Spice-Trade and the Traffick of the Eaſtern 'Iſlands make Batavia, which is their Em- 'porium, no improper place for the reſidence 'of their Governor-General: But our Settle- 'ments have very little *Commercial Connexion* 'with each other, and Bengal is by its ſitua- 'tion and circumſtances the moſt unfit for a '*Political* Super-Intendance: During many 'Months no Ships can come out of Bengal 'River without the utmoſt difficulty, and 'theſe are the months when an enemy will

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* Fatal Experience has ſince ſhewn that Lord Pigot was in this Sentiment miſled by the goodneſs of his own heart.

'arrive

'arrive in India; ſo that every thing may be 'loſt on the Choromandel Coaſt before *or-* 'ders for *Hoſtilities* could be received from 'Bengal.

'But, independent of Situation, the parti- 'cular circumſtances of Bengal confines it to 'a narrow bound: The Countries to the 'Eaſt of Bengal are ſuch, as threaten no in- 'vaſion, and deſerve no political conſidera- 'tion; on the Weſt, are independant Ma- 'ratta States againſt whom the Company can 'never carry on an offenſive war; they muſt 'be kept at home, either by ſowing diſſen- 'tions amongſt them, or by raiſing jea- 'louſies in the great Tribe of Marattas; 'Bengal muſt ever be confined to a mere de- 'fenſive war, nothing ſhould induce us 'to go beyond the Provinces, but Sujah 'Dowla being abſolutely attacked in his own 'country, as he muſt be conſidered as our 'Barrier to the North: The Force in Ben- 'gal ſhould never be diminiſhed ſo as to 'expoſe thoſe Provinces to danger from the 'North, nor ever more than neceſſary for 'their own Defence.'

'In the Service of the Company it has 'generally been underſtood that the higheſt 'appointments, Civil and Military, were to 'be made without an abſolute attention to 'Seniority; the Governor being thus ſelected 'from the Members of the Council, is ſuffi-'cient encouragement to Merit, whereas 'precipitate promotion might bring a man 'into the higheſt truſt before his judgement 'was ripened.

'The ſucceſſion to the Governor-General-'ſhip, ought to be in the *Senior Governor* 'belonging to *any* of the Preſidencies, who 'had paſſed through his government with 'approbation.'

Very different from theſe ideas, was the Plan adopted by Lord North, if Plan it can be called: The Company's affairs were no leſs deranged *abroad* than at *home*: Parliament indeed appointed a *nominal* Governor General; but this *nominal* General-Government was *eſtabliſhed* in *Bengal*; and although the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* had a controuling power over the *other Preſidencies*, ſo

ſo far that theſe Preſidencies were not to commence Hoſtilities, make War, or negociate or conclude any Treaty with Indian Princes, *except in caſes of neceſſity*, or by *The Company's Special Orders*, without the concurrence of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, who were authoriſed to *ſuſpend* the Preſident and Council of any Settlement *offending* in *theſe matters*, yet there was no *efficient* power veſted in them, for the Governor-General and Council of Bengal could *not order* a *ſingle ſoldier*, from either of the other Preſidencies, or one Shilling out of their Treaſuries, had the Fate of India depended upon It: Thus, without having authority to apply the whole Force of the Company to *One Point*, they were only inveſted with the power to *diſtract* Affairs.

It had been always uſual, for the different Preſidencies to correſpond with each other, on matters of Politicks as well as Commerce; and They were directed by the Company to co-operate with one another. The *Anarchy Bill* directed the Other Preſidencies to com-

municate Intelligence to Bengal, but the reciprocal communication from Bengal was not enjoined; and the other Preſidencies were left in the dark: a ſtronger example cannot be given, than concerning the *Firſt Maratta Treaty*, concluded at *Poona* on the 1ſt of March 1776.

During Col. Upton's negociations there was ſo little proſpect of ſucceſs, that the Governor General and Council of Bengal, on the 7th March 1776, wrote to us, at Madraſs, to ſay, that, as the Marattas "were determined to hear of Peace on no "conditions that ſhould not be *excluſively* "*honourable* and *advantageous* to *themſelves*" They had come to the reſolution of *ſupporting Ragabah*; and deſired that letters might be written, to various Indian Potentates, to promote a *General Confederacy* in *Ragabah's cauſe*, which they had recommended in letters to thoſe Potentates: at the ſame time they deſired us to aſſiſt Bombay, with ſome Battalions of Seapoys, and engaged to reimburſe any expences, which we might incur, on that account.

When

When this letter arrived at Madraſs, (28th March) we had intelligence that a Treaty was actually concluded, and *Ragabah's* cauſe *abandoned:* Lord Pigot, then juſt ſetting out for Tanjour, and his Council therefore wrote to Bengal (on 29th March) to ſay, that we had ordered two Battalions of Seapoys to hold themſelves in readineſs to march to the *Malabar Coaſt*; but that, in conſequence of the intelligence we had received of the Peace, we ſhould take no further ſteps till we heard again from Bengal: The Treaty, *abandoning Ragabah's cauſe*, was in fact concluded; but the Governor General and Council wrote no more to us on the Subject; although it was natural to have expected their approbation of our conduct; and it was incumbent on them, to communicate the Articles of Peace their Agent had concluded. The Men, who ſubverted Lord Pigot's Government, urged as an objection to his Lordſhip, that he had paid no attention to the requiſition, from the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, to write letters to the Indian Princes, to promote a *general Confederacy* in *ſupport* of *Ragabah*; an inſtance of Political

Political Modeſty and Wiſdom worthy *their Friend* Lord North himſelf.

After the eſtabliſhment of this new Government in Bengal, there was very little Commercial Communication; and ſeveral Cargoes remained upon the Coaſt, for want of Ships being ſent from Bengal; though *Coaſt Cargoes* are *ready Money* to the Company in England.

The evil conſequences of *eſtabliſhing* in *Bengal* this General Government, limited as it was, have been notorious, in a Syſtem of Romantick Politicks, interweaving in a web of negociation, almoſt every power in the vaſt extent of Country from Bengal to Bombay; many of theſe powers too remote for us to meddle with.

The *Authority* of the Company, *at home*, received a *Mortal Blow*, when the State took from them the power of diſmiſſing *their own Servants*, if the Company's Servants they were, ſince appointed, not by the Company, but the State! who compelled the

the Company to pay the Governor-General and Council, enormous Salaries to the amount of £65,000 ℔ *annum*; a Sum more than equal to *two* ℔ *cent. Dividend* on *the whole Capital Stock* of *the Company*. Parliament alſo appointed, at the ſame time, a *Supreme* Court *of Judicature* in *Bengal*; conſiſting of a *Chief* and *three Puny* Judges, with Salaries, to be paid by the Company, to the amount of £26,000 ℔ *an*. Theſe and the contingent charges of this Court have coſt the Company £47,000 ℔ *an*. (on an average of ſix years) amounting in the whole, ſince the Court's inſtitution to the end of 1781, to no leſs a Sum than £314,000, nearly 10 ℔ *cent*. on the Company's Capital! what advantages have accrued to the Company, or to the Publick, beyond what would have been derived from the *Mayor's Court*, and *Court of Requeſts* (which together coſt £1,800 ℔ *an*.) is *One* of the *Law Myſteries*, which, probably, *Time* will *never diſcover*.

I cannot omit obſerving, that the Eſtabliſhment of this *Supreme Court* of *Judica-*

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ture in *Bengal*, was *unneceſſary* for ſecuring the Indians from oppreſſion; or, if *neceſſary*, that it has proved, *ineffectual:* there not being *one example*, ſo far as I can learn, of any European having ſuffered, by the ſentence of that Court, for oppreſſing the Natives: and the Puniſhment of *Nundocomar* with *death*, for a Crime committed, before that Court had exiſtence, proves that the Judges were not reſtrained, by any ſcruples, from *retroſpective Judgement:* We may therefore naturally infer, that thoſe Cruelties and Oppreſſions, which were much talked of, *never exiſted*, but in the heads or hearts of weak and wicked men; who, from *credulity* believed, or from *intereſted motives* reported, what was without foundation.

By theſe Parliamentary Appointments the Company have been burthened with

Salaries to *Governor General* and *Council* -	£	65,000
Charges of *Supreme Court* of *Judicature* exceeding the expences of the Mayor's Court and Court of Requeſts - -		45,000
per Annum	£	110,000

competent

competent to pay the *Intereſt* of £2,200,000 *India Bonds*, a ſum that would relieve the Company, from their preſent embaraſſment; or have prevented that embaraſſment.

The Directors being choſen, by the *Anarchy Bill*, for *four* years, were rendered leſs diligent and attentive to their ordinary duty, than when they were under apprehenſion that *neglect* would have excluded them from the *Houſe Liſt*, as propoſed Candidates, at the ſucceeding years Election.

By being choſen for four years, They alſo became leſs ſubordinate; and, without ſubordination, the executive part of Publick Buſineſs, cannot be well conducted.

The only reaſon I have heard aſſigned for the prolongation of the Director's term, to *four* years, is that "They might ſee the "Orders they gave, carried into execution; "or have it in their power to enforce Obe-"dience." To give weight to this reaſon; It is neceſſary that the Directors give *Orders*

but once in *four* years, otherwiſe the period of their duration ſhould be for *ever*, inſtead of *four years*.

I believe no Perſon in the leaſt acquainted with General Courts, or with the Proceedings of the Directors, ſince paſſing the *Anarchy Bill*, or with the Hiſtory of India, can point out *one* Advantage, which the *Change* has produced. Since then every thing has been gradually running to ruin, and all the old Regulations have been aboliſhed or neglected: The Court of Directors have not written *one General Letter* nnder the *eſtabliſhed heads* ſince 1773 to Madraſs, or, I believe, to any other Settlement: Inſtead of the *Abſtracts* of *Letters Received* and *Sent* and of *Country Correſpondence* being entered in *Conſultation*, the *whole* letters are inſerted in the *body* of the Conſultation;[a] whereby the Records are made too voluminous for inveſtigation: the Conſultations are filled with Minutes of Diſputation of the ſeveral Members; the Regular Gra-

[a] Only ſome, not all the letters in the *Country Correſpondence*, are now entered in the *Conſultations*.

dation

dation has been infringed; every kind of Diſſipation is introduced into the Company's Settlements, Play-Houſes, Horſe-racing, &c. no Monthly Accounts are given in to Council, nor Balances reported: The Extraordinary Diſburſements of the Paymaſter's Accounts are no longer entered on Conſultation monthly: many of theſe Abuſes appeared ſo flagrant, that I urged Lord Pigot, during the ſhort time of his laſt Adminiſtration, to correct them: He recommended to poſtpone the Buſineſs, till we had taken a Review of the various changes which had been introduced ſince old Times; and had well conſidered what were abuſes, and what the change of circumſtances had warranted; juſtly obſerving, that a propoſal of partial reform might raiſe alarm, and obſtruct effectual remedy; but having the whole Syſtem before us, free from any private views as we were, we ſhould be ready to adopt any improvement which could be ſuggeſted, and too well prepared to be oppoſed in our Plan of Regulation: but the Misfortunes which befel him prevented this Buſineſs from being carried into effect.

That India can never be preſerved in order without ſome *Court of Judicature at home*, to take cognizance of complaints and miſbehaviour, in a ſummary way, without the indeciſion, delay, chicane and ruinous expence of our preſent Courts of Juſtice or Parliamentary Proceedings, has always appeared to me ſelf-evident: I formerly hinted at ſuch a Committee of the Houſe of Commons, as that inſtituted for the Trial of conteſted Elections; but, perhaps, it would be more conſonant to the principles of our Conſtitution, if this Committee was formed by *eight* Perſons named by the Crown, *eight* by the Houſe of Lords, and *eight* by the Houſe of Commons: an equal number of each *voting* on all queſtions; and in caſe of equality of Votes, the caſting Vote rather to *The Crown* than to *Chance*.

Theſe State Commiſſioners, like all other Officers, would be liable to Parliamentary Impeachment, but They ought to be amenable to none elſe for their Conduct; though removeable at the will of thoſe who appointed them, and others appointed in their ſtead:

but

but the Commiſſioners appointed by the King removeable only by the King; thoſe by either Houſe of Parliament by that Houſe only.

The Preſident of this Council of the Indies ſhould be named by His Majeſty, and the two Secretaries of State and Chancellor of the Exchequer ſhould be officially Members.

Every Perſon tried by this Court ſhould have an option of putting the Members on oath, upon that particular occaſion, to decide impartially; *no pleadings* of *Law-Counſel* being allowed, but every thing coming before the Court ſhould be recorded; all Expences be born by the Publick 'till the deciſion: and every Perſon, under trial or examination, continued in the emoluments of Office 'till acquitted or condemned; in the laſt inſtance a mulct may be laid on, at the diſcretion of the Court.

This Court ſhould be competent, as a Court of Appeal, to decide in all matters concerning the India Company, at home or abroad,

abroad, with power of inflicting puniſhment even to *Death* for offences committed abroad: not leſs than *two thirds* of the Members preſent agreeing in the ſentence of condemnation; the number neceſſary to form a Court in *Capital Caſes* not leſs than *twelve*, nor in other caſes leſs than *nine:* with the reſervation that no Perſon ſhould be liable to ſuffer death for any offence committed before ſix months after the Act of Parliament, eſtabliſhing this Court, is promulgated in India; that every Perſon may have an option, by leaving India, to remove himſelf, from Its Juriſdiction.

The ſame preciſe privileges which every Engliſhman is entitled to *at home*, can never be *ſecured* to him *abroad*, without deſtruction to the Publick Intereſt: if he has relief at home, in caſe of any flagrant injury, it is all the Liberty he can enjoy conſiſtent with the Publick Welfare; and they ought to ſtay in England, who are not ſatisfied with that.

No legiſlative poſitions relative to common Government, can be applied to the dominion

nion of a *conquered* people, who muſt ſtill be *Slaves*, however light their *yoke:* Slaves can only be governed by deſpotick Power; and they will be *happily* governed, if that *Deſpotick power* is conſtantly amenable to *Impartial Juſtice.*

I am perfectly convinced, any Attempt, to introduce a Code of Laws for the Indians, will be *ruinous:* The Indians are ſo devoted to their own cuſtoms, which they enjoyed *many ages before* we, in this Iſland, had *even painted Anceſtors*, that the Engliſh Laws are not ſuited to Them: and although in criminal caſes, they may, in general, be introduced, they are not by any means applicable to common government, and will tend naturally to deſtroy *that principle* of *benevolence*, which is the link of Society amongſt them; every Conqueror of India, muſt follow the example of former Conquerors, and leave the Indians to Themſelves, who have exiſted, as a *civilized* and *poliſhed* People, many *thouſand years*, without ANY LAWS but *religious*, and without ONE *Lawyer* by *trade* amongſt them: So long as the Natives continue

tinue to be governed by *manners* and not by *Laws*, India may eaſily be preſerved under our Dominion; if the Hand of Superintending Power is made ſtrong to puniſh Delinquents. We have therefore nothing to do but to ſee that they are protected; and encourage the introduction of the *Engliſh Language*, which will eſtabliſh our Empire for ever.

An effectual Syſtem for India, muſt veſt the Supreme controul and puniſhment in England, and the Supreme Political Authority abroad.

When this Kingdom had no Intereſt in the Eaſt Indies but merely *commercial*, the acquiſition of private Fortunes might be conſidered as an object of Publick Importance; but the preſent connexion is of ſuch a nature, that the Publick Intereſt directs every advantage to be thrown into the hands of the *Natives* living under our protection; and I am convinced it would be moſt for their Intereſt, not to permit any Europeans whatever to interfere in the branches of Commerce, which the Indians can carry on; viz. to all parts of Indoſtan, the Gulphs of Perſia

Perſia and Arabia, as well as the Countries to the Northward of the Strait of Malacca: Engliſh Navigators may be wanting to navigate the Ships; theſe uſed formerly to be employed by the Indians at a conſiderable Stipend, with certain priviledges of Trade: Theſe Mariners ought to be required to give in the Journals and Logbooks of their Voyages, at whatever Settlement of the Engliſh they import: and the Adminiſtration abroad ſhould have authority to ſend them, or any other European, to England after due notice, aſſigning in writing the cauſe of ſuch a meaſure, and recording the written reply; that a full and fair ſtate of the caſe, according to both Parties, may be ſeen at home.

The Eaſt India Company muſt be conſidered in two lights; as *Commercial* and *Political;* but the *two* are *inſeperable:* and if the *Politicks* are not made *ſubſervient* to *the Commerce*, the deſtruction of the Company muſt enſue. The *corps diplomatique* will exclaim againſt a *Set* of *Merchants* GOVERNING *India*, without adverting that neither the *Proprietors* of *India Stock*, the *Directors*, nor the *Company's Servants abroad*, are ALL *Merchants*: men of undiſcriminating minds, do not

 perceive

perceive the difference between Perſons acting in behalf of a Publick Concern, and Perſons acting merely for their own peculiar Intereſt; in the latter caſe, narrow ſelfiſhneſs may grind the hearts of the poor for gain, but the general oppreſſion of a Publick Body, muſt proceed from Error in Syſtem, and not from ſordid views: however to prevent effectually the Company's ſervants from oppreſſing the Indians, or injuring the Company, all *perquiſite* ſhould be aboliſhed; and Europeans, in general, debarred from being concerned in any Trade whatever, beyond the Company's own Settlements. The *Trade*, in the Country, except ſo far as concerns the Company's Inveſtment, being left to the *Native Indians*, on paying the accuſtomary 5 ℔ *cent. import* and *export* duty, but all internal Trade to be *free from impoſts* of *every kind*; for it is impoſſible to prevent exactions and frauds where there are petty Cuſtom-Houſes.

In lieu of all Emoluments whatever, the Company to defray, either by a liquidated Sum, or regular Account, not exceeding a ſtipulated Sum, the expences of the Governors,

and

and Members of the Councils; the inferiour Servants having a monthly allowance adequate to a comfortable ſubſiſtence, and apartments according to their rank; but no equivalent to be allowed for Houſe-rent.

As a compenſation to the Company's Servants, every Perſon under Council ſhould have an annuity of £20 ℔ *an.* for every year he had been in the Company's Service: Thus a Writer at the end of *five* years ſervice, would be entitled to an annuity of £100 in caſe the Climate diſqualified him from remaining longer in India: a perſon at the end of *eleven years* ſervice, commencing *Senior Merchant*, would in like manner be entitled to £220 ℔ *an.* theſe are not ſufficient objects to induce Men to reſign the Service, which will never reap any benefit from thoſe who do not, in the early part of Life, look up to a Government; and although the honeſt induſtrious man of narrow faculties, who is found at laſt unfit for this great truſt, be entitled to a competence in the decline of Life, the reward ſhould not come, even to Him, at an earlier period.

Every Member of Council ſhould be entitled to £5000 for every year, he has ſerved in that ſtation, to be paid on his reſignation; or, in caſe of death, to his Heirs; and if he is ſuperceded in the Government, after he riſes to 2d of Council, an annuity of £500, beſides the annuity of £20 for every year he has been in the ſervice.

A Governor ſhould, in like manner, be entitled to £20,000 for every year He is in the Government, and to an annuity of £1000 for every year he is continued in that Station thus if he continues *three* years in the Government he will be entitled to £60,000 and £3000 ℔ *an.*; if *five* years to £100,000 and £5000 ℔ *an.* The Money he is entitled to as a Member of Council to be included in the allowance of Governor, if he remains two years in the Government; and, in caſe of death, the amount to be paid to his Heirs: but the Annuity to ceaſe.

That only *wilful fraud* or *embezzlement*, ſhould forfeit theſe allowances to the Governor, or Member of Council; but the conſent

ſent of the Governor and Council to the reſignation of inferiour Servants ſhould be requiſite to entitle them to any recompence: an end ſhould be put to the practice, now got into uſe, of Company's Servants coming to England, on frivolous pretences; They ſhould forfeit their rank, unleſs they come for health, with permiſſion of the Governor and Council and the Certificate of the Company's Doctors, and in this caſe, the time of their abſence from India ſhould be excluded in the term of their annuity.

I would eſtabliſh ſimilar equivalents to Military Officers, prohibiting all Plunder or Prize-money; but, as Military Officers are entitled to the benefit on the Military Fund, I will not attempt to determine what ſhould be the equivalent annuity to them.

The Savings from aboliſhing the Supreme Court of Judicature in Bengal, Lord Clive's Jaghire now expiring, a certain proportion of the Revenues and a *pro rato* on the Commerce, ſhould conſtitute a Fund for paying theſe annuities.

The

The abſolute prohibition of receiving preſents is incompatible with the manners of every Civil Society; according to the letter of the Act of Parliament on this head, any Perſon *receiving fruit*, or *beetle*, which is conſonant to a *pinch* of *Snuff* in *this Country*, is liable to be ſent to England: whatever Law is made too ſevere to be ſtrictly executed, becomes in itſelf nugatory: I would therefore only totally prohibit preſents in *Money*, or of great value, and require that all others ſhould be regiſtered in a Book, kept for that purpoſe, open to Publick Inſpection; making the Perſon, who neglects to regiſter preſents received or exchanged, liable to a forfeit, of double the value of the Preſent ſo received or exchanged, payable into the *Fund* of *Annuities*.

When I went laſt to India in 1775, the Company required me to enter into Covenants, *not* to *receive* Preſents, *above* a certain amount, *without leave*; which certainly implied permiſſion to receive preſents to that Amount; however, as I did not approve of Preſents in *Money*, I would not take thoſe, uſually

uſually offered, of a few Rupees; a Vakeel, or Miniſter, of one of the Northern Rajahs, at Madraſs, finding me inflexible; aſked "if, "when I went on the Committee of Cir-"cuit, I would refuſe *large preſents* in like "manner;" I aſſured him that I would receive *no money*, on that ſervice, and that It would be their own fault if any other did, for that if They would let me know, I would prevent it: the income of a Member of the Council of Fort St. George, was only about £800 ℔ *an.* a ſum I think much inferiour to what it ought to be.

The firſt Step to introduce Order, is a preciſe detail, of the Company's Eſtabliſhment, at *home* and *abroad*; denoting what are the duties of each Officer; this is a regulation amongſt the Spaniards; They had, at Manila, a Book of all the Royal Officers, in which was a detail of the ſeveral functions and duties of their Offices.

I would propoſe to leave the Proprietors, poſſeſſed of £500 Stock, for a year, to chuſe

chuſe Directors annually from Proprietors with the qualification of £2000 Stock. To encreaſe the qualification of a Director to £5000, would reduce the number of Candidates for the Direction, and tend to make the Company a *Junto:* whether it would be proper to give Proprietors a vote, for every £500 India Stock they poſſeſſed, might admit a queſtion, but I think it can admit of none, that Proprietors ſhould have votes in ſome proportion, if not entirely adequate, to their Stock, to prevent the danger of Split-Votes.

I would propoſe to aboliſh the limitation of four years, and make the Directors eligible every year, ſo long as their Conduct was ſatisfactory to the Proprietors: for the beſt Plan of Government ſeems to be, where the Governors are *perpetual* by the frequent re-election of their Conſtituents.

In every poſſible inſtance, rules of conduct ſhould be eſtabliſhed, and a deviation from thoſe rules, by the Directors, rendered as difficult as poſſible: for whilſt the Directors have

have ſo much at *will* in their diſpoſal, they will too often be Slaves to intereſted Proprietors.

The Directors ſhould have the appointment of Writers and Cadets for India, and of every Officer at home; eſtabliſhing a regular gradation, as well in the Shipping, as Houſe, or Warehouſes: and whenever any perſon was *ſuperſeded*, the *Specifick Reaſons* ſhould be recorded, and the concurrence required, of *two thirds* of the Members preſent, in that Superceſſion.

The regular ſucceſſion in any Corps is attended with much greater advantage than a Syſtem of irregular promotion, as the *accidental* appointment of an *extraordinary* man does not compenſate for the *multitude* of *unworthy preferments* from partialities, connexions, or private intereſts: indeed *extraordinary* men are moſt likely to be brought forth by the *fair trial* of *abilities:* and when it is known, that by *Time* men muſt riſe to higher offices of emolument, if their own conduct does not preclude them, They are of courſe leſs rapacious, than when they conſider themſelves,

ſelves, only as Tenants-at-will: by a regular gradation Men are brought forward in the habit of knowledge in their duty and profeſſion: Genius will, undoubtedly, often make Improvements, which a profeſſional Education would not diſcover; but the general benefits of a regular gradation, in the excluſion of Ignorance and Intrigue, are more than ample compenſation for the few Geniuſes who may be loſt; at the ſame time, it very ſeldom happens but that Genius will make its own way, in ſpite of all Obſtructions; and, perhaps, thoſe very obſtructions may exalt and improve it. When I was a young man in the Company's Service, I thought it hard that there was no ſcope for ambition; and that the greateſt drone would riſe as faſt as the man who exerted himſelf to the utmoſt; but experience has long convinced me, that nothing mars a man's elevation ſo much as too quick-promotion.

The number of Servants to be ſent abroad, ſhould always be regulated by the requiſition from the Company's Adminiſtrations in India.

I re-

I remember when I was a Boy at Madraſs, to have read, in the old records, with a *glow* of pleaſure, a letter from the Court of Directors, when they appointed Mr. Higginſon, a Factor, they ſaid " They hoped none of " their Servants would take this amiſs; for " that his Father had been a good and faith-, " ful Servant, and that they conſidered the " Son, as a *Child* of the Company's." This is engaging the virtuous paſſions on their ſide, and virtuous paſſions will do more than all the penal laws which can be conceived: It will be highly proper to eſtabliſh it as a fundamental rule, that the Son of any Man who has ſerved the Company with integrity for *twenty years*, or died in their Service, ſhall be entitled to an appointment in that Service.

I would propoſe to lodge a power of appeal, from any Perſon at home or abroad, to the General Court of Proprietors, againſt the deciſion of the Court of Directors, their Orders however not to be diſpenſed with, without the concurrence of *two thirds* of the Members of Adminiſtration abroad, and

inſtitute the mode of conducting the Enquiry in the General Court, by a Committee; *one third* nominated by the *Appellant*, *one third* by the Court of Directors, and *one third* by Ballot; and leave an ultimate appeal from the General Court of Proprietors to the Council of State for the Indies.

I would propoſe to give to the Court of Directors, ſubject to the controul of the General Court, the whole *commercial* and *internal* management of the Company's affairs, at home and abroad, partitioning the Court of Directors into Committees, as diſtinct Boards, 1ſt. Correſpondence, 2d. Shipping, 3d. Warehouſe and Sales, 4th. Buying, 5th. Accounts: The Chairman and Deputy, as at preſent, being Members of all Committees, but *no other* Director to be at once Member of *two* of the foregoing Committees, and no Directors but ſuch as are Members of the Committee to have a *voice* in it, every Committee however to be open to all the Directors, and the Proceedings of all Committees ſubject to the reviſal of the Court of Directors.

But

But as the Political State of India, is now ſo interwoven with the National Concerns of the State, at the ſame time that it is inſeparable from the Company's Commerce; I would propoſe a Committee of *eight* deputed from the Company to be joined to a ſtanding Committee of *nine* Commiſſioners, from thoſe appointed conjointly by the Crown and both Houſes of Parliament, the Preſident of this Council of the Indies, the two Secretaries of State, and Chancellor of the Exchequer being always Members of this Board, from which all Political Orders to India ſhould be directed to a Governor-General and Superiour Council for Political Affairs, not fixed to any Settlement, but to the Scene of Action in War, or wherever occaſion may require in time of Peace.

This Superior Council ſhould conſiſt of

The Governor and Captain General.
The Governor of the reſpective Settlement as his *Lieutenant* or ſecond.
The Admiral or Commanding Officer of His Majeſty's Ships.

The

The Superior Military Officer.
A Judge.
The Treaſurer and Accountant.
The Secretary.

The Authority of this Superiour Council to extend, in general, over all Commercial, Political, Naval and Military Concerns in India, with a power, in *caſes of neceſſity*, of changing the deſtination of any of the Company's Ships, and appropriating the Company's Money to any exigence which may occur; but whenever the deſtination of a Ship is changed from its commercial voyage, the expence incurred, ſhould be charged to the Political Account Current, and the Company's Commercial Account credited for the Amount; and the ſame to be done, in every other deviation of their Commercial Property, by this Superiour Council.

The Detail of the Inveſtment, Revenue, and internal Affairs, of each Settlement, ſhould be left to the Ordinary Government of the Preſident and Council of ſuch Settlement, with whom the Court of Directors ſhould

ſhould correſpond as uſual on all thoſe matters.

The Committee, from the Company to the Council of the Indies, ſhould be recommended by the Court of Directors, but *ſix* choſen by the Proprietors; the Chairman and Deputy to conſtitute the other *two*.

I would propoſe to ſecure a Dividend of *eight per cent.* to the Proprietors, if their commercial profits allow: and appropriate all Surplus Revenue, after defraying *every Military* and *Political Expence*, to the Sinking Fund, allowing the Proprietors of India-Stock an Intereſt of *three ℔ cent. ℔ an.* on a moiety of this Surplus.

Perhaps it would be proper to conclude with ſome Obſervations concerning the mode of carrying on the Company's Inveſtment in India; as ſome of the Regulations, propoſed in the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, would have operated to its deſtruction; which I can only aſcribe to want of practical knowledge of the ſubject: however I am induced to prefer giving theſe *Obſervations* concerning the *Company's Inveſtment* in a Tract by itſelf.

17th May, 1784.

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